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Abstract 
 
The relation between the regimes of the accumulation of men and the accumulation of 
capital is problematised in the works of Michel Foucault. The paper challenges the 
prevailing wisdom that the relation between these regimes is contingent. The fundamental 
question of the conditions of the possibility of relation between the two regimes is raised. 
It is argued that both regimes are primordially related. Focusing on the Foucauldian 
analysis of the regime of the accumulation of men and its constituent elements an effort is 
made to the matize the primordial relation between the two regimes. It is shown that 
freedom is the condition of the possibility of a primordial relation between the two 
regimes. It is explained why freedom plays such a fundamental role in making possible 
and sustaining a capitalist order. The dual role of freedom as a principle of diversity and a 
principle of management is stressed. It is argued that capitalism as an order is conditioned 
upon the production and reproduction of individuals and populations that are 
simultaneously useful and free. It is also the condition of such an order that docility is 
produced without hampering utility.  Freedom makes possible the enhancement of utility 
without making it unmanageable. 
 
I) Introduction 
 
A certain understanding of capitalist rationality permeates Foucault’s work. However the 
historical mode of Foucault’s presentation makes it difficult to grasp the originality and 
the systematic nature of his analysis. In recent years, the work carried out by authors 
related to what has been dubbed the governmentality school has gone a long way towards 
repairing the situation (Burchell et al eds: 1991, Rose et al, eds: 1996, Rose: 1993). 
However, the emphasis of their work has been on liberalism rather than on capitalism.i 
The primordial relation between liberal modes of governance and capitalist rationality is 
not very clear in their work. It is the purpose of this paper to try to shift the emphasis of 
the analysis through reconstructing the framework of Foucault’s conception of capitalism 
and its rationality. 
 
I argue that understanding the double character of freedom is central to Foucault’s 
understanding of capitalist rationality. The originality of Foucault’s analysis lies in his 
realisation that capitalism manages individuals and populations (primarily) through 
freedom and not (primarily) through repression. I argue that freedom is the condition that 
makes possible the correlation between what Foucault terms as the accumulation of men 
and the accumulation of capital.  
 
I would like to state a few disclaimers at the beginning. I am not going to discuss the 
work of governmentality theorists. Critiquing their work is not my aim. Rather, I treat 
their insights as my starting point in order to develop a certain reading of the key 
Foucauldian texts. Secondly I am not going to reconstruct the Foucauldian concept of 
capitalist rationality as a whole. My aim is more modest and more basic. My aim is to 
point towards the condition(s) that make(s) possible capitalism as an order.  
 
A few words are called for on the terms used. Foucault uses capitalism in an historical 
sense. It is in an historical sense that Foucault investigates the meaning and conditions of 
capitalism. Foucault understands three different things through the term capitalism: a) A 
political order which accumulates individuals and populations in a certain manner. 
Foucault calls this the regime of the accumulation of men. b) On the other hand Foucault 
understands capitalism to mean an economic system that is geared towards the 
accumulation of wealth. Foucault calls this the regime of the accumulation of capital.ii c) 
Thirdly capitalism means for Foucault an orderiii that is the basis of the two regimes 
mentioned above. Here capitalism is not just a political or an economic system; it is 
primordial and is the condition of the possibility of both. At this level accumulation is 
understood in a primordial sense. It is not yet differentiated into accumulation of wealth 
(economy) and accumulation of men (polity). It, rather, provides the condition for any 
such a differentiation. 
 
I use the term primordial (Ursprünglichkeit) in a Heideggerian sense.iv It is meant to 
convey a simple but often neglected fact. We understand particulars only in the context of 
a ‘whole’. However the whole does not reveal itself to us directly. It remains implicit. It 
requires a special effort to make it explicit (Brandom, 1994, Brandom, 2000). The 
‘whole’ is the condition in the context of whose implicit awareness we approach 
particulars. We never encounter the ‘whole’ as such. However, we can make the ‘whole’ 
explicit thorough approaching particulars with this specific purpose. In our case a & b are 
particulars which are understood in the context of c however c is not explicit. It remains 
implicit. By concentrating on a or b or both, with the purpose of making c explicit we can 
make the sense of capitalism as a ‘whole’ explicit. One of the purposes of the present 
essay is to make c explicit. However c can only be made explicit by either concentrating 
on a or b or on both. 
 
Lastly I use the term necessity and contingency in entirely historical terms. It was one of 
the innovations of Foucault to give us the notion of historical necessity. An idea or a 
relation may be necessary today but it can lose its necessity tomorrow and can become a 
contingency. Foucault claimed that historical practices are both empirical and 
transcendental. They are empirical as far as they are (in principle) “always surpassable” 
(Veyne, 1997: 228). However they are transcendental and hence necessary and 
“constitutive as long as they are not effaced” (ibid.) - as long as they are our present. 
Thus when I claim that the relation between the regime of the accumulation of men and 
that of capital is necessary I mean by that historical necessity and not any other sort of 
necessity.  
  
II) Accumulation of Men and Accumulation of Capital  
 
Foucault’s analysis of the relationship between the regimes of the accumulation of men 
and the accumulation of capital provides us the space to reconstruct the condition(s) of 
the possibility and continued sustenance of capitalism as an order. It is normally 
understood that Foucault studies the strategies of the accumulation of men as the function 
of the problem of governance but what is seldom understood is that Foucault treats the 
problem of governance not in isolation but in relationship to the problem of the 
accumulation of capital. The problem is not just the governance but the type of 
governance that provides the space in which hindrances to capital accumulation are the 
least while its possibilities are being utilised to the maximum. Thus the problem is not 
just one of producing docile bodies but one of producing docile bodies which are also 
useful. The purpose of producing docility is to maximise utility. The type of docility that 
hampers utility is unacceptable. Therefore the problem of governance in Foucault is the 
problem of the governance for capital accumulation (and for nothing else). According to 
Foucault, disciplines, which are “the ‘techniques’ for assuring the ordering of 
multiplicities” and enhancing governance, have the purpose of increasing “both the 
‘docility’ and the ‘utility’ of all the elements of the system” (DP: 218). Foucault in 
general terms makes it clear that: 
 
"The two processes – the accumulation of men and the accumulation of capital – cannot 
be separated; it would not have been possible to solve the problem of the accumulation 
of men without the growth of an apparatus of production capable of both sustaining 
them and using them; conversely, the techniques that made the cumulative multiplicity 
of men useful accelerated the accumulation of capital . . . Each makes the other possible 
and necessary; each provides a model for the other” (DP: 221). 
 
However the problem is not just of showing how the system of producing docility is 
correlated with the system of utility maximisation and how the techniques used in one 
system could be projected on to and used in the other. Foucault’s analysis points to a 
level deeper and subtler than this. Foucault’s analysis points towards the fact that how 
prior to this correlation and as the condition of the possibility of this correlation there 
exists a more primordial relationship between the system of the accumulation of men and 
the system of the accumulation of capital.   
 
It is not the case that there is one system for the production of docility - of governance 
and there is another system for the production of utility - of capital, which are then 
correlated and reinforce each other. Prior to this and as the condition of the possibility of 
this correlation and reinforcement, there exists, so to speak, a primordial order which is 
at once the way of governance and capital accumulation. The polity in capitalist order is 
already a capitalist polity. It is not just an instrument in the hand of capitalists. No 
wonder Foucault defines disciplines as "the unitary technique by which the body is 
reduced as a 'political' force at the least cost and maximised as a useful force" (DP: 221 
emphasis added).  Thus the capitalist government and the capitalist system of 
productivity and exchange are two sides of the same coin (HS: 140-141). In a capitalist 
system both polity and economy are geared towards the singular aim of simultaneously 
producing utility and docility. The polity and economy are equally productive in a 
capitalist order. In a capitalist system wealth and men are equally treated as capital. They 
are geared towards accumulation in a manner that maximises utility and docility of both 
simultaneously. Not only men need docility wealth also need docility. Both men and 
wealth need to be bared from accumulating in non-capitalist forms.  
 
III) Regime of the Accumulation of men 
Foucault says that ““. . . the economic system that promotes the accumulation of capital 
and the system of power that ordains the accumulation of men are, from the seventeenth 
century on, correlated and unseparable phenomena . . . .” (FR: 67). My purpose in the rest 
of this essay is to try to find out what makes these two processes inseparable. Since 
Foucault does not study the process of the accumulation of capital in any detail our only 
window to this is to concentrate on the process of the accumulation of men which is 
analysed by Foucault in considerable detail in his works. In what follows I shall 
concentrate on the constituent elements of Foucault’s analysis of the accumulation of 
men with the sole purpose of answering the question raised above. I hope that this will 
also provide the answer to our question concerning the condition of the possibility of 
capitalism as an order.  
 
III.1 Capitalist Subjectivisation Regime 
 
“Subjectivity” is defined by Foucault as a form of “organisation of self consciousness” 
(PPC: 253) implying that there may be forms of organisation of self-consciousness other 
than subjectivity/subject. I define manageable subjectivity as a subjectivity that has two 
characteristics; it has some degree of freedom/diversity and secondly this diversity is 
amenable to organisation under a singularity. We cannot talk of a manageable 
subjectivity without the presence of these two elements. Management techniques are not 
operable on individuals who are not allowed freedom. One cannot talk of managing 
slaves in this sense. Hence Foucault asserts “power is exercised over free subjects, and 
only insofar as they are free” (SP: 221 emphasis provided). Similarly one cannot talk of 
manageable subjectivity if diversity cannot be traced back to a singularity. Diversity that 
cannot be traced back to a singularity leads to “dangerous subjectivity” (PPC: 125-151), a 
subjectivity that is not manageable. 
 
The apparent paradox of capitalism is that in order to increase the utility and productive 
capacity of individuals and populations it requires continuous expansion in the ambit of 
freedom and diversity. But in order to make individuals docile and hence governable, it 
needs to limit this diversity. It is on the maintenance of this delicate balance between 
diversity and singularity that the sustenance and continuity of the whole capitalist system 
rests. Curbing freedom and diversity would decrease utility and productivity and hence 
slow down the motor of production and innovation on whose ever-increasing speed the 
legitimacy of the whole system depends. On the other hand expansion in the ambit of 
freedom and diversity to the extent that it becomes untraceable to a singularity would de-
link diversity from capital accumulation. It would become ungovernable (hence creating 
a crisis of governance) in the sense that it would no longer be a capitalist governance i.e. 
governance for capital accumulation. (and it alone) 
 
Thus curbing freedom is not what capitalism requires. The continued existence of 
capitalism requires the continued expansion of the sphere of freedom. However, 
capitalism requires that this expansion be geared towards the single end of. capital 
accumulation. The problem of capitalism is not freedom but the intransigence of freedom, 
the possibility that freedom may take forms that are not traceable to the singularity of 
capital accumulation. Thus the problem of capitalism is neither servitude nor freedom per 
se, the problem of capitalism is the problem of the intransigence of freedom (SP: 221-
222).v 
 
Freedom is central for the functioning of a capitalist system not only as the precondition 
for enhancing utility and diversity but for its double role as the precondition for 
enhancing diversity and imposing singularity on multiplicity (SP: 221). Historically 
freedom has played the role of “imposing” singularity over multiplicity through the 
process of subjectivisation, through the creation of a subjectivity/subject. Two key 
concepts, which have been operationalised to create and justify capitalist subjectivity, 
have been very important, viz.: the notion of identity (in the natural law tradition) and 
morality (in the Kantian tradition).vi 
 
The notion of identity provides the focal point to which all diversity and multiplicity 
refers. In the natural law tradition freedom is defined in terms of being one’s 
true/authentic self. The formation of capitalist subjectivity is closely related to the notion 
of identity to the extent that Foucault defines the meaning of the term subject in terms of 
the notion of identity: “There are two meanings of the word subject: subject to some one 
else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-
knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject 
to” (SP: 212 emphasis added). The form of power Foucault mentions here is the power of 
management. It manages individuals and populations by tying their activities to their 
identity, by referring back all diversity to identity and hence ‘imposing’ singularity over 
multiplicity. As Foucault puts it:  “This form of power applies itself to immediate 
everyday life which categorises the individual, marks him by his own individuality, 
attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognise 
in himself" (SP: 212). This double game that freedom plays in the system can be 
understood as conceiving freedom as a centre from which rays emanate in every 
direction, only to converge back to the centre. Identity provides the basis of this 
convergence. The notion of identity and self-subjection are very important in this context 
because through them singularity is imposed not from above but emerges from within. It 
is important because if power is (solely) imposed from above, it can hamper utility and 
would defeat the purpose of the whole exercise.vii  
 
In the Kantian tradition morality plays the same role. Through Kant’s conception of 
morality as self-determination room is provided for diversity but through the conception 
of categorical imperative singularity is ‘re-imposed’ on this diversity. Self-determination 
is moral only to the extent that it can ultimately converge back to this singularity. 
Foucault considered the “form of a morality acceptable to everyone . . . as catastrophic” 
precisely because it is the imposition of a singularity over diversity. Similarly Foucault 
praised Greek morality because it lacked the conception of imposition of singularity over 
diverse moral experiences, in diverse domains concerning diverse strata of population. 
There was no single morality for all. Foucault praises Greek morality for having “several 
forms of freedom” (PPC: 245). In Greek morality there was “no one single domain that 
would unify all moral domains”(PPC: 261). Christianity effected this change by 
introducing the notion of morality as a singularity: “(a)mong the great transformations 
that Christianity was to bring about was the notion that the ethics of flesh was suited for 
women as for men. In the ancient morality, on the other hand self control is a problem 
only for the individual who must be master of himself and master of others and not for 
those who must obey others. That is why this ethics concerns only men and does not have 
exactly the same form when applied to relations with one’s own body, with one’s wife, or 
with boys” (PPC: 261-262). Modern capitalism derived its conception of morality from 
Christianity and applied it (with modification of course) to manage the ever-growing 
diversity that is the hallmark of capitalist societies.  
 
The important thing to note is that the conception of morality provides the means to 
manage individuals and populations from within by creating a criterion of propriety 
within each and every individual. This is important again because it provides the basis for 
the management of individuals, and the diversity of their desires with the minimum use 
of overt oppression. This facilitates the minimisation of any negative impact on their 
productivity.  
 
III.2 Capitalist Truth Regime  
 
Foucault’s overall conception of truth is fairly Heideggerian. The notion of universal 
truth is a dangerous chimera as it is a tool to impose singularity in the name of 
objectivity. It is a chimera because human finitude leaves no room for the transcendence 
of the sort that goes hand in hand with the notion of objectivity. Truth for Foucault on the 
other hand is ‘produced’ within discourse and it is meaningless to speak of truth outside 
discourse. As Foucault puts it,  “ . . . the problem does not consist in drawing a line 
between that in a discourse which falls under the category of scientificity or truth, and 
that which comes under some other category, but in seeing how historically effects of 
truth are produced within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false” (FR: 
60, emphasis added).viii Thus truth is always an embodied and embedded truth. It is 
embedded in the overall discursive structures and is produced and reproduced through 
this very embeddedness.  
 
The ‘general politics’ of truth establishes what would be counted as truth and what would 
be counted as untruth in a society (FR: 72). This ‘general politics’ of truth imposes 
singularity over the multiple of truths accepted in any society. But what distinguishes the 
‘general politics’ of truth in capitalist societies from other societies is its unique blend of 
diversity and singularity, docility and utility. The same double bind operates here which 
we saw operating in the subjectivisation regime. On the one hand the requirements of 
productivity and utility entail and demand increasing profusion and diversity of the 
multiple forms of truths but the requirements of capitalist governance demand that this 
multiplicity be traceable to the singularity of capital accumulation. All the diversity and 
multiplicity must converge to this single truth that defines all truths (FR: 72-73). 
 
The capitalist truth regime plays an important role in this regard. The ‘objective’ truths, 
that are compatible and conducive to the singularity of capital accumulation, are 
constantly produced, reproduced and circulated about the individual, his body and soul so 
as to standardise/normalise his ways of acting and being (in the context of the diversities 
that are allowed). The capitalist truth regime ensures that only those ways of acting, 
behaving and being are considered normal and hence rational that can be subsumed under 
the singularity of capital accumulation. All other subjectivities are labelled/stigmatised as 
unnatural, abnormal, delinquent and hence irrational and are rigorously excluded and 
marginalized (FR: 73-74). 
 
The particular function that the capitalist truth regime plays in this regard is two fold. 
First it standardises and normalises behaviour. It then presents that behaviour as the 
‘correct’ and ‘right’ behaviour. Hence making sure that individuals accept it from within 
and it is not seen as imposed from above. Secondly, it invents/evolves 
procedures/techniques to gain access to individuals and populations. The purpose is to 
render them manageable. The capitalist truth regime creates the normative truth about 
individuals and populations. However it also provides the resources needed to have 
access to their factual truths. The truth of individuals and populations in both senses is 
needed to maintain their productivity and manageability at the same time.  
 
The central theme of the techniques of correction and education is self-discipline. This is 
the essence of disciplinary technologies and discipline is impossible without self-
discipline. Self-discipline is made possible through the production of a soul within every 
individual. This soul is the effect of the production of the truth of an individual (in both 
senses) and of the employment of the techniques of observation, surveillance and 
correction. The truth regime is productive in this sense and is directly related to capitalist 
production.  
 
The capitalist soul is not a chimera or illusion but a real effect of the microphysics of 
punitive power and the general form of power derived from it. The capitalist soul is 
produced through a privileged access to the truth of individuals. The truth regime literally 
produces capitalist individuality. The capitalist soul is what makes possible self-surrender 
to the logic of capital (DP: 29-30). As Foucault puts it: “The man described for us, whom 
we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection much more profound 
than himself. A ‘soul’ inhabits him and brings him to existence, which is itself a factor in 
the mastery that power exercises over the body. The soul is the effect and instrument of a 
political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body” (DP: 30, emphasis added).  The 
capitalist truth regime through the production of the capitalist soul pre-structures any 
exercise of freedom from within hence fulfilling the dual needs of maximising utility and 
docility.  
 
III.3 The Capitalist State 
 
The state may be defined as the structure of legitimate obediences. Foucault uses the 
word state in two senses: limited and broad. The limited sense of the word state 
corresponds to the ensemble of coercive and administrative institutions, what Foucault 
calls “institutions of power” (HS: 141 emphasis retained). But Foucault claims that these 
great “institutions of power” are supplemented by and depend upon "the rudiment of 
anatomo – and bio-politics created . . . as techniques of power present at every level of 
the social body and utilised by very diverse institutions (the family and the army, school 
and the police, individual medicine and the administration of collective bodies). . .” (HS: 
141 emphasis in original). Foucault’s insight is that the structures of legitimate 
obediences are not only saturated in the ‘institutions of power’ but on the other hand are 
permeated throughout the social body. The penetration of these structures (relations) of 
legitimate obediences was made possible by the invention of what Foucault 
interchangeably calls society and population. Population is defined as “a group of beings 
living in a given area” (PPC: 83). Thus society can be understood as individuals in their 
relations.  
 
The innovation of the bourgeoisie was to create these concepts and turn them into the 
object of government. It was said that “government not only has to deal with a territory, 
with a domain and with its subjects, but that it also has to deal with a complex and 
independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulation as 
well as its possibilities of disturbance. This new reality is society” (FR: 242). The society 
and population as the object of government provide the way of penetration for the 
structures of legitimate obediences (power relations) deep into the social body. In 
capitalist societies “power relations are rooted in the system of social networks” (SP: 
224). It is through these power relations rooted in the system of social networks and its 
allied micro institutions such as the school, the hospital, etc, that the state has been able 
to have access to and the ability to structure relationships (SP: 224). In a similar fashion it 
is through the power relations rooted in the system of social networks that the state has 
been able to have access to and structure relations between self and self i.e. to 
individualise (SP: 214).  
 
It is here that we arrive at the second and broader conception of the state. In this broader 
sense the state would include both the state in the restricted sense and the whole system 
of social networks. This can be further elaborated/understood with reference to the 
concept of government. While state in the limited sense corresponds to the restricted 
sense of government as an institution (SP: 224), the state in the broader sense of the word 
corresponds to the broader sense of the government to include both the government of the 
individual (government of individualisation) and the government of population. The state 
in the broader sense is not an institution but a particular rationality of government, a form 
of political power (PPC: 24). It is to this broader sense of the state that Foucault is 
referring when he writes: “ . . . since the sixteenth century a new political form of power 
has been continuously developing. This new political structure . . . is the state” (SP: 213).  
It is in this sense that the state has been the condition of the formation and development 
of capitalism and can be termed as the capitalist state. 
 
The capitalist state is a totally new phenomenon in the known history of statehood. The 
way this is so can be understood by contrasting the capitalist state with the forms of state 
that existed before. 
As against feudal societies where the state was essentially separated from the individual 
and society, in the modern period this separation between state and society cannot be 
maintained. In feudal societies the state functioned largely in negative terms in the sense 
that its basic relationship with individuals and society was that of prohibition and 
inhibition (HS: 135). The state in feudal societies did not possess nor did it need the 
power over individuals and the social body that is the hallmark of the present times. The 
power the state possessed over the individual and society was essentially negative (HS: 
136). The feudal state swings between the two extremes of taking life or letting live, it 
has no power over life in its positivity. Nor has it any interest in seeking such a power. 
The feudal state’s relation to life has been pure negativity (HS: 136).  
A new form of state has, however, emerged in the capitalist era. If the previous form of 
state swung between extremes of taking life or letting live this new state assigns itself the 
task of life administration (HS: 136). Power in the capitalist state is not exercised “in the 
name of the sovereign who must be defended” but in the name of “the existence of 
everyone”, in the name of the “entire population”. The modern capitalist state takes the 
responsibility for and “guarantees” the “individual’s continued existence” by assuming 
the right to manage life. Thus modern state power is “exercised at the level of life, the 
species, the race, and the large scale phenomenon of population” (HS: 137). While the 
feudal state was centred on the phenomenon of death, the capitalist state is centred on 
life; it legitimises itself as the manager of life (HS: 138).  
The change in the nature of the state mentioned above has widened its ambit to include 
‘life’ in its totality. In this sense the capitalist state includes 'every thing' [this corresponds 
to the early modern concept of ‘police’ as found in Cameralism and German 
Polizeiwissenchaft (PPC: 79)]. Thus the capitalist state is a ‘totalising’ force in the 
manner the feudal state was not. It must administer life as a whole. What Meszaros has 
written about the totalising character of capital is equally true of the capitalist stateix: “ 
(T)he capital system is (the) first one in history which institutes itself as an 
unexceptionable and irresistible totaliser . . . .”(1995: 41). 
Capitalist “state power”, Foucault writes, “is both an individualising and a totalising [read 
socialising] form of power. Never, I think, in the history of human societies-even in the 
old Chinese society – has there been such a tricky combination in the same political 
structure of individualising techniques, and of totalisation procedures" (SP: 213). Nothing 
escapes the capitalist state.x 
IV) Conclusion 
There are two possible ways of understanding the relationship between the regimes of the 
accumulation of men and the accumulation of capital. One view is that relations are 
external to concepts and hence contingent. According to this view we would not have to 
conceptually look further than describing historically how these two different regimes 
interacted throughout history. This is not a Foucauldian perspective. Foucault’s analysis 
points towards primordial relation between the two regimes - the relation that makes their 
contingent historical relation possible.  
Our brief survey of the regime of the accumulation of men, as analysed by Foucault, 
points to a single conclusion. Freedom is the condition that makes possible the 
primordial link between the regimes of capital accumulation and the regime of the 
accumulation of men. The subjectivisation regime works on the condition of freedom. A 
capitalist subjectivity cannot be constituted without freedom. The management of this 
subjectivity is also impossible without freedom. Freedom is the means to produce a 
subjectivity which is capable of maximising utility without making it too difficult to 
manage. Similarly the capitalist truth regime works on the assumption that discipline 
must be ultimately based on self-discipline. Otherwise individuals and populations cannot 
be managed without hampering productivity. Once again freedom seems to be the central 
condition of the whole process. And finally, the state does not control through repression. 
It does not control through deduction. It manages through dissemination and 
multiplication. It is based on the strategy of life enhancement and empowerment rather 
than curtailment. It curtails through enhancement and empowerment. Here again freedom 
seems to be the condition of the working of the modern capitalist state. It manages 
individuals and populations on the condition that it will increase their freedom and it 
presupposes that they are already free. Only then is it possible to develop populations that 
are maximising their utility and productivity and are manageable at the same time. 
If my account above is correct it makes the correlation between the regime of the 
accumulation of capital and the accumulation of men clear. Capitalism is both a political 
and an economic order. It is based on the condition of freedom because freedom provides 
on both sides an indispensable element that is the condition for making the dual elements 
of productivity and manageability, utility and docility possible. It is true for both the 
regime of capital accumulation and the regime of the accumulation of men. Markets work 
on the premise of freedom but they need to be managed so that this freedom is used to 
maximise utility without making the whole system unmanageable. Similarly the regime 
of the accumulation of men needs to accumulate individuals and populations without 
making them unmanageable. Freedom is needed to manage both markets and populations 
from within. As Foucault clearly saw these two systems are interrelated and conditioned 
on each other. However this correlation is possible only because both regimes are based 
on, and conditioned upon, something primordial. That something is freedom.  
 
                                                 
1. Or to be more precise even when they discuss the ‘capitalism’ side of the equation they tend to focus 
their analysis on the ‘regional’ aspects hence avoiding grand themes like capitalism. A tendency which 
certainly has basis in Foucault’s own writings.  
2. On a & b see DP: 137-138. 
3. On Foucault’s views on order see, OT: xxi-xxii. 
4. For Heidegger’s conception of primordiality see BT and also In wood (1999: 150-153). 
5. This is why radical democracy is impossible within capitalism.  
6. I am not implying here that these traditions are exclusive. In fact Kant provides a link to both.  
                                                                                                                                                 
7. Obviously this is not to imply that in a capitalist system power is never imposed from above. This is not 
the case. What I am trying to argue is that this is not the primary and basic mode of management in a 
capitalist system. 
8. This is Heidegger pure and simple. Cf. BT sections 43-44 and Mulhall, 1996: 94-104 for lucid and 
excellent exposition of Heidegger’s basic insight on this.  
9. This is due to the fact that the underlying rationality is the same. 
10. This is the ambition of this state, its nature. 
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